Budget Formulation and Implementation in Korea: A Macroeconomic Perspective by He, Dong
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Budget Formulation and Implementation
in Korea: A Macroeconomic Perspective
Dong He
International Monetary Fund
March 2003
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9756/
MPRA Paper No. 9756, posted 29. July 2008 01:48 UTC
- 22-
II. BUDGET FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION I~ KOREA:
A MACROECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1
A. Introduction
1. Korea has an admirable tradition of fiscal conservatism, with a deep-rooted resistance
to incurring fiscal deficits and public debt. On the eve of the financial crisis that enipted in
late 1997, gross public debt was below 10 percent of GDP as a result of near balanced budget
outcomes in the preceding decade. The fiscal accounts, however, have not been very
transparent: the budget structure is unnecessarily complicated and fragmented; and
weakesses in budget formulation and implementation make the budget a poor indicator of
the overall fiscal stance and reduce its efficiency as a tool of macroeconomic policy.
2. In recent years the government has introduced a medium-term plan for fiscal
consolidation and initiated refonn measures to improve fiscal transparency. A special law on
fiscal soundness was submitted to the National Assembly in 2001 that aims to achieve a
balanced budget and ensure prudent debt management. There is a polítical consensus in
Korea on the need to reduce public debt, which, although low by OECD standards, is at
historically high levels as a result of the financial crisis in the late 1990s. There are also plans
to revise the Budget and Account Law to adopt performance-based budget preparation and
implementation and to ensure better provision of information on fiscal operations to the
public. These reform measures notwithstanding, more consideration needs to be given to the
role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic management. In particular, there is a need to
formulate fiscal policy in a medium-term framework so that the fiscal stance is appropriate to
developments in the business cycle.
3. Fiscal policy as a tool of macroeconomic management is hampered by two factors.
First, the automatic fiscal stabilizers are relatively weak in Korea. The weakness of the
automatic stabilizers reflects the small size of government and the small social welfare
system, which means that expenditures are relatively insensitive to fluctuations in economic
activity. Second, there is a relatively high degree of uncertainty about fiscal outcomes in
Korea, with actual budget outtms often deviating from the budget plans by a large margin.
Thus, the impact of fiscal policy in any given year is often different from what was initially
intended or considered desirable, with the risk that it becomes destabilzing. In paricular,
large systematic expenditure shortfalls and overshooting of revenues tend to make the fiscal
stance pro~cyclical during an economic downtu.
4. This chapter describes the main featues of the Korean fiscal system from a
macroeconomic perspective. It discusses why fiscal outtrns tend to differ from the budget
and makes suggestions to improve budget formulation and implementation. It also discusses
how medium-term fiscal objectives such as maintaining a balanced budget and reducing
public debt can be reconciled with the short-term objective of avoiding procyclical fiscal
impulses in a downtun.
1 This paper was prepared by Dong He (APD).
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5. The following section describes the main characteristics ofthe revenue and
expenditure structures and analyzes how such characteristics affect the size of automatic
fiscal stabilizers in Korea. Section C describes patterns of deviations of budget outtrns from
budget plans and analyzes the causes for such deviations. Section D discusses the impact of
the budget on aggregate demand. Section E presents recommendations about the role of a
medium-term fiscal framework in strengthening the budget as a tool of macroeconomic
management. Section F concludes.
B. Main Features of Government Expenditure and Revenue
6. Since the mid-1980s, the Korean
government implemented conservative
fiscal policies that contributed to low
gross public debt on the eve of the
1997-98 financial crisis.2 The principle
of "expenditue within revenue," which
was adopted in the mid-1980s, limited
spending commitments to anticipated
revenues, even though no formal fiscal
rules were imposed by the constitution
or by legislation. The breakout of the
financial crisis in late 1997 marked a
major shift in the stance of fiscal policy.
Instead of balanced budgets during a
period of high growth, the government
ran large deficits during the crisis,
reflecting the shar contraction of tax
receipts in the economic downtu as
well as discretionary fiscal support to
demand. In addition, the governent
incurred large contingent liabilties by
guaranteeing bonds issued by the
Deposit Insurance Fund and the
Nonperforming Assets Management
Fund in the context of financial sector
restrcturing.
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2 Korea was one of the few OEeD countres where net public debt was negative; that is, the
central government was a net creditor to the other sectors in the economy. There are doubts,
however, about the quality of government assets, which are mostly loans to local
governments and private entities (Koh, 2000).
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7. Another defining characteristic
of Korean fiscal conservatism is the Gereral Governnt Spendin by Economc Category(in pl!reent ofGDP in 2tX.U)
relatively small size of governent. On (ßcome Subsidies Interest Consumption ~etCalital Total
a general government basis, total public Transfet'S Paymenls Outlays Ouilays
expenditure in 2000 amounted to Ko'Ca(200) J.6 O.J 0.7 10.1 8.3 23.0
23 percent ofGDP, the lowest except for Australia 8.9 l. 2.0 t8.5 2.2 32.7Germny 18.9 1.6 3.J t9.0 3.0 45.7
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far higher spending levels.
8. Moreover, the composition of
govemment expenditures by economic
classification differs substantially from
most OECD countries. Three major
factors underlie the comparatively low
public spending level in Korea. First,
income transfers are limited by the
relatively small size of the social safety
net. At 3.6 percent ofGDP, such
spending is a quarer of the GECD
average, although it is higher than in
Mexico. Second, government
consumption, at around i 0 percent of
GDP, is well below the OECD average of 17 percent. Third, relatively low public debt
translates into modest interest payments as a share of GDP. In contrast, public investment is
exceptionally high, with net capital outlays exceeding 8 percent of GDP. The structue of
public expenditure classified by fuction also shows large differences with other OECD
countries. Publicly provided social protection is significantly lower in Korea. On the other
hand, defense spending; at around 3 percent of GDP, is double the OECD average, reflecting
continued security concerns in the Korean peninsula.
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9. The Korean tax system is characterized by a low overall tax burden and limited labor
market distortions (OECD, 2000). Total government revenue, at 23 percent of GDP. were
among the lowest in the OECD. The low tax burden in Korea reflects a combination of
narrow tax bases and relatively low marginal effective tax rates. The tax mix in Korea relies
more heavily on consumption and
property taxes than many other OBCD
countres. The 38 percent share of
consumption taxes in total revenues is
substantially higher than in countres
such as Japan and the United States,
despite a shar fall in recent years,3 In
addition, taxation of labor (as measured
by average effective tax rates) is much
lower in Korea than elsewhere in the
OECD, while average taxation of
consumption and capital appear to be
close to the GECD average.
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Tax Structure in Selected OI!CD Countries in 2000
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10. These characteristics of government expenditure and revenue render the automatic
fiscal stabilizers weak in Korea. As indicated by van den Noord (2000), the most important
factor detennining the cyclical sensitivity of the fiscal position is the size of the general
government sector: the larger the share of government expenditure in domestic output, the
greater is the sensitivity of the fiscal position to fluctuations in economic activity. The
progressivity of taxes, the generosity of unemployment benefits and the cyclical sensitivity of
varous tax bases are also significant factors in determining the cyclical sensitivity of the
fiscal position. In future, the automatic stabilizers in Korea may be strengthened as a result of
expected changes in the size and structue of governent spending and tax reforms discussed
below.
1 1. The size and strcture of
govemment expenditue and revenue in
Korea are likely to experience
significant changes over the medium
term, Social welfare spending increased
as the social safety net was expanded
after the 1997-98 financial crisis.
Subsequently, the government launched
the "productive welfare" system in
October 2000 to ensure minimum
subsistence standards, which made
social benefits under the Basic
Livelihood Protection Program a right
for those who qualify. The newly elected government of President Roh, Moo-hyun may
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3 The share oftaxes on goods and services in total tax revenue was 60 percent in 1985 and
43 percent in 1995. A lower share of indirect taxes will tend to increase the progressivity of
the tax system.
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further expand the safety net. Over the longer term, spending pressure are likely to accelerate
as a result of population ageing and the consequent demands on social spending, notably on
pensions and health care. In addition, Korea faces the uncertain cost of potential unification
with Nort Korea.
12. The overall tax burden is also likely to rise to finance the higher spending pressures
noted above and because tax revenue wil probably grow faster than income, reflecting a
progressive income tax system in an environment of fast economic growth. The government
has initiated reform measures to address the weaknesses of the tax system, which include
generous allowances and loopholes for individuals, large-scale and wide-ranging tax
preferences for enterprises, and an inappropriate taxation of propert (OECD, 2000). The aim
is to create an attactive business environment and improve equity and efficiency by
broadening the tax base, lowering tax rates, and making the system more transparent and
easier to understand. These reform measures wil likely change the tax mix significantly,
raising the share of direct taes relative to indirect taxes, and the share of individual income
taxes relative to corporation taxes.
C. Budget Structure, Formulation, and Implementation
i 3. Even though fiscal discipline has
been maintained at the aggregate level,
fiscal management in Korea suffers
from important weakesses. Insuffcient
transparency of the budget reflects its
highly complicated and fragmented
strcture (Box 11.1). The extensive use
of special accounts and public funds,
with eararking of revenue resources,
weakens fiscal planning because the
budget authorities have little control
over a significant share of public
spending. The fragmented strcture
prevents a holistic view in determining
priorities for the use of government
resources, or even risks overlapping expenditures from different accounts or fuds to serve
the same policy objective.
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14. From a macroeconomic perspective, the fragmented budget strcture makes it
diffcult to form a meaningful view of the budget in economic tenns. The use of a number of
different budget concepts risks misunderstanding or confusion about both the policy stance
and policy intentions. Given uncertainty about spending out of the public fuds, the total
level of expenditue on a consolidated basis is unown when a new budget is prepared and
approved by the parliament. Such uncertainty reduces the usefulness of the budget as a tool
of macroeconomic policy since the impact of government expenditue on private sector
demand also becomes uncei1ain.
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Box 11.1. The Budget Structure and Budget Concepts
There are four different types of accounts or funds in the Korean budgetary system: one General Account (GA), 22 special
accounts, 47 public funds, and more than ten "other" funds. The GA comprises about half of central governent spending on a
consolidated basis. The proliferation of special accounts and public funds reflects the legacy of the cconomic policies of the
i 960s and 1970s when a range of eannarked taxes and so-called quasi-taxes were created to finance public investments and
loans to achieve specific policy objectives. While these accounts and funds have separate budgets and are managed
independently, there are very complicated financial transfers among thcm, thus reducing transparency and masking
accountability.
· The GA includes all transactions not classified by law as being undertaken by special accounts or funds. It is used to carr
out the general purposes of governent and its constituent ministries rather than being restricted by taw to a specific
program.
· Special accounts were introduced for certin government activities. These accounts can be divided into four categories:
(i) business-like activities such as railway, telecommunications, and grain management, which would typically be
nonfinancial public enterpriscs in other countries; (ii) special funds using earmarked sources of revenue, such as taxes, fees,
and charges for particular government activities (e.g., toll roads, energy and resources, rural tax, and agriculture and fisheiies
strctural adjustment); (iii) financing funds, such as those for fiscallending and shared taxes to local governments; and
(iv) miscellaneous smaller fuds, such as that for prison operations. Special accounts are usually managed by the relevant
tine ministry, although responsibility for some special fuds is shared by several ministries.
· Public funds were introduced for major government activities involving the receipt and disbursement of funds. They can be
divided into six categories: (i) the largest are the pension, unemployment, and health insurance funds, which are typically
trust funds in many countries; (ii) the public money management fund collects the proceeds from government borrowing and
channels it to the GA, the Fiscal Lending Special Account, and othcr public funds; (iii) classic revolving funds such as for
the aid budget; (iv) earmarked funds; (v) various industry funds, lending from which is below market rates; and (vi) a large
national housing fund that supports low-income households.
· "Other" funds are established under laws pertining to the non-government sector and are not managed by line ministries.
However, ministr officials are often appointed as board members, allowing them to exert indirect control. Some "othet'
funds have been established to deal with financial sector restructuiing (the Nonperforming Assets Management Fund, and
the Deposit Insurance Fund); and there are also some guarantee funds and earmarked funds.
The annual provisions in the budget for the GA and the special accounts need to be approved by the National Assembly (NA).
TIie budgets and accounts of public funds are presented to the NA for information, but the decision on the financial balances to
be achieved by the funds is determined by the relevant ministries, in consultation with the Ministry of Planning and Budget.
However, revisions to the Fund Management Act in December 2001 require that the public funds be subject to parliamentary
approval beginning with the 2003 budget. This reform also increased the coverage of public fuds by transfonning a number of
"other" funds into public funds, The balances of "othet' funds are not subject to approval by the NA; nor is information on
their balances required by the NA.
The authorities use four different budget concepts for the centrl government in budget documents:
· The narrowest budget concept covers only the GA. The detailed information by the functional, economic, and organizational
classifications is only provided for this budget concept.
· A second budget concept covers the GA and the Fiscal Lending Special Account, netting out internal transfers. This is the
total amount of "the budget," and it is the rate of increase in this aggregate that is announced by the government in its public
presentation of the budget.
· A third and broader budget concept covers the GA and all 22 special accounts. It is the official budget, as defined in the
Budget and Accounts Act, that is proposed by the government and approved by the NA. Detained information on sector
amounts and their main programs are published together for this budget concept.
· The broadest budget concept is the consolidated budget, which covers the GA, all22 special accounts, and all public funds. It
is compiled and calculated according to the GFS rules (but excluding the "other" funds), specifying the financing and netting
out internal transfers. When the authorities refer to the fiscal balance, this is the budget concept used.
The consolidated government budget suffers from weaknesses in its coverage and methodology. First, the GFS accounts do not
include local governents, which hampers budget planning and monitoring at the general government leveL. Second, the
budget is recorded on a cash-basis, which fails to deliver a fair and accurate picture of the impact of government activities on
its overall financial position. In addition, fiscal data are typically published in highly aggregated form; and including
pnvatization receipts above the line obscures underlying developments. Some ofthese problems are being addressed, The
authorities currently plan to include local governments in the consolidated budget starting in 2003 and to move by 2005 at the
latest from the present cash-based accounting to accrual accounting standards, a change that is in line with the new GFS
standards,
15. Budget formulation also suffers
from incentives that adversely affect the
behavior of government officials. Whether
for historical or cultual reasons,
"overperformance"-in the sense of
conservative revenue estimates and under-
spending by ministres resulting in better-
than-expected budget balance outturns-
was encouraged. There appears to be a
view among government officials that "the
larger the surplus the better.,,4 This
approach fostered a tradition of
deliberately conservative revenue
forecasting, leading to a tendency for
overshooting in revenues; and of implicit encouragement to line ministries to plan for a
cushion so that spending did not exceed the budgeted amount, leading to systematic
expenditure shortfalls.5 (Table ILl)
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16. Weaknesses in budget implementation also contribute to large deviatIons between
budget plans and outturns. An'angements for regular in-year monitoring and reporting on
expenditue and revenue developments, with an analysis of causes of deviatIons from plans,
are not well developed. Monitoring spending from the public funds is the responsibility of
the line ministries concerned, rather than the MPB or the MOFE. This mitigates against clear
analysis ofthe development of the overall fiscal balance during the year, or of the most
economical cash management techniques to balance shortfalls and surpluses in individual
accounts. Most fudamentally, there is no provision for a comprehensive mid-year review of
the budget, using updated forecasts of the economy and expected fiscal outturns, which
would provide a clear basis for decisions about needed fiscal measures such as
supplementary expenditue provisions or other in-year measures, and give a firm framework
for the following year's budget proposals.
4 For example, offcials of the Ministr of Finance and Economy have described fiscal
performance in 1999-2001 as follows: "Fiscal policy and public debt management have been
exemplary, with the fiscal balance showing better results than budgeted figures for three
consecutive years."
5 Non-interest expenditure was 1.3 percentage points of GDP lower than budgeted in 2000,
0.9 percentage points lower in 2001, and estimated 0.6 percentage points lower in 2002. The
shortfall in 2002 would have been larger were it not for the supplementary budget of
W 4.1 trilion (0.7 percent ofGDP) approved in September 2002 to finance typhoon-related
reconstiuction.
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Table II. 1. Consolidated Central Government Operations, 2000-02
2000 2001 2002
Budget Actual Budget 1/ Actual Budget Est.
(in trillons of won) 
Revenue 120.8 135.8 142.7 144.0 154.4 156.5
Tax revenue 79.7 92.9 95.9 95.8 103.6 104.1
Social security contributions 17.5 14.8 16.0 17.5 18.2 19.1
Nontax and capital revenue 23.6 28.1 30.8 30.7 32,6 33.4
Expenditure and net lending 136.2 129.3 150.2 140.5 153.8 144.0
Current expenditure 101. 92.8 107.0 107.8 118.9 i 135
Interest 14.1 12.5 7.6 13.3 15.5 13.4
Non-interest 87.0 80.3 99.4 94,5 103.4 100.2
Capital expenditure 23.1 22.3 25.7 24.9 26.4 25.6
Net lending 12.0 14.2 17.5 7.7 8.5 4.9
Balance
-15.4 6.5 -7.6 3.6 0.6 12.5
Financing 15.4 ~6.5 7.6 -3.6 -0.6 -12.5
Domestic financing 15.6 -6.1 7.9 -3.2 -0.1 -12.0
of which: Privatization 3.5 0.0 3.0 3.7 5.4 6.7
External Financing
-0.2
-0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
(in percent of GDP)
Revenue 23.1 26.0 26.2 26.4 26.6 26.9
Tax revenue 15.3 17.8 17.6 17.6 17.8 17.9
Social security contributions 3.4 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.1 3.3
Nonta and capital revenue 4.5 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.1
Expenditure and net lending 26.1 24.8 27.6 25.8 26.5 24.8
Current expenditure 19.4 17.8 19.6 19.8 20.5 19.5
Interest 2.7 2.4 1.4 2.4 2.7 2.3
Non-interest 16.7 15,4 18.2 17.3 17.8 17.2
Capital expenditure 4.4 4.3 4.7 4.6 4.5 4,4
Net lending 2.3 2.7 3.2 1.4 1.5 0.8
Balance
-2.9 1.3 -1.4 0.7 0.1 2.2
Primary balance
-0.2 3.6 0.0 3.1 2.8 4.5
Memorandum items
Overall balance (incL. privatization)
-18.9 6.5 -4.6 7.3 6.0 19.2
(as percent of GDP) -3.6 I. -0.8 1. 1.0 3.3
Nominal GDP (trillion won) 522.0 522.0 545.0 545.0 581.2 581.2
Sources: Ministr of Planning and Budget; and Fund staff estimates. 
1/ Including supplementar budgets.
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D. The Budget as a Tool otMacroeconomic Policy
17. The tendency for systematically larger-than-budgeted surpluses (or smaller deficits)
implies a systematic contractionary bias in fiscal policy that reduces its effectiveness as a tool
of macroeconomic management. This bias is particularly damaging during an economic
downtum because it means that fiscal policy tends to be inappropriately pro cyclicaL. As
shown in Figure II. 1, since 1971, fiscal policy was contractÎonary in 12 of the 18 years when
the output gap was negative, i.e., when actual output was below potential output.6 In other
words, fiscal policy was supportive of growth only in six out of those I 8 years. Two of the
six years of supportive fiscal policies were during the 1997-98 financial crisis. In strong
economic upturns, the contractionary bias in fiscal policies may result in a welcome stronger-
than-budgeted counter cyclical fiscal stance, as in 2000.
Figure II. Output Gap and Fiscal Impulse
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Source: Fund staff estimates.
6 The fiscal impulse is defined as the change in the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance. A
positive fiscal impulse implies that the fiscal stance is "looser" or more expansionary than the
previous year, a negative impulse implies a "tighter" or a more contractionary fiscal stance,
and a zero impulse implies a "neutral" fiscal stace.
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18. The effectiveness of the budget as a tool of macroeconomic policy is also blunted by
the way the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy are described and presented to the public.
The Korean authorities traditionally focus on the contribution of government expenditure to
real GDP growth when describing the stance offiscal policy, which, not surrisingly, is
almost always "expansionary." This is misleading since it omits the negative impact on
aggregate demand from taxes that reduces the disposable income of the private sector. In a
world of imperfect competition, the fiscal stimulus to aggregate demand, expressed as a
percentage ofGDP, is given by (Chalk, 2002):
6YlYi = ß*6GlYi - J.*LVilY¡
where 6Yt = Y¡ - Yt-1, ß is the expenditure multiplier, and J. is the revenue multiplier. Thus,
the stimulus provided by the tiscal position to aggregate demand is given by the change in
real expenditure and real tax revenues weighted by their respective multipliers. Accordingly,
the positive contribution to GDP of higher real governent expenditue alone is not a proper
measure of the demand effect of the govemment budget, since it ignores the negative
contribution to GDP of higher real government revenue.
19. Figure IL2 shows the evolution of the demand impact measure in Korea for both the
budget and the outtrn in 2000-02, as well as the contribution of real govemment
expenditure to GDP, calculated as the change in real governent expenditue from year t-l
to year t as a proportion of real GDP in year t. The multipliers for current expenditue, capital
expenditure, and revenue, which are derived from simulations using the BOK
macroeconomic model, are 1.5, 1.2, and -0.9, respectively. The multiplier for net lending is
assumed to be 0.7, considering that private sector investment is unlikely to change by the
same magnitude as the change in government net lending. The contribution of real
government expenditure was always positive and typically overstated the impact of the fiscal
position on domestic demand. This was most obvious in 2000, when fiscal policy was
significantly contractionary and had a fairly large negative impact on domestic demand.
20. An important debate in Korea is whether surpluses from social security funds should
be excluded from the overall balance when assessing the fiscal policy stance. Some argue on
Ricardian grounds that social security contributions should not reduce private sector demand
because such contributions are regarded as perfect substitutes for private savings. However,
even if full Ricardian equivalence is assumed for social security contributions, these are a
relatively small par of total government revenue (12 percent in 2001), and the negative
demand impact of other government revenue needs to be taken into account in assessing the
stance of fiscal policy.
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Figure 11.2. Demand Impact of Fiscal Balance
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E. The Role of a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework
21. A special law on fiscal soundness was submitted to the National Assembly in 2001
that aims to achieve a balanced budget in the medium term and ensure prudent debt
management. It would require that a medium-tenn fiscal plan be presented to the National
Assembly along with the annual budget bil. Since the consolidated central government
balance has been in surplus since 2000, the objective of achieving a balanced budget
presumably means a balanced budget excluding surpluses of the social security fuds (SSF),
an objective estimated to have been achieved in 2002.7
7 Yet another interpretation of the balanced budget target is to treat the additional outlays of
absorbing part of the cost of financial sector restructuring as spending. In the four year period
of 2003-06, the government plans to convert W 49 trilion of maturing government-
guaranteed bonds issued by the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Nonpedorming Assets
Management Fund into treasury bonds. The target can then be interpreted as achieving a
balanced budget by 2007, by which time the bond conversion exercise wil have been
completed. However, such debt conversions are below-the-line transactions and should not
be considered as sources of deficit.
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22. While the introduction of a medium-tern1 goal of a balanced budget may be
appropriate, the connection between the objective and the annual budgeting process is
unclear. It is partcularly important to clarify that the medium-term objective implies an
arumal balanced budget on a cyclically-adjusted basis, Although the principle of "expenditure
within revenue" has the merit of fiscal prudence when applied over the business cycle, it is
unnecessarily restrctive as a guide to anual budgets in an advanced economy such as
Korea. Most economic policymakers in advanced economies have long accepted the
importance of focusing on the underlying structural budget balance rather than the actual
balance, which reflects the stage of the business cycle. In a period of economic downturn, the
government should accommodate the higher fiscal deficit and not seek to achieve annual
balance budget targets that may risk being pro-cyclicaL. In other words, the objective of
maintaining a balanced budget should be achieved over the course of a business cycle rather
than in every year irrespective of the cycle. 
8
23. Cyclical deviations from the balanced budget norm could come from both the effects
of "letting automatic stabilizers work" and the use of discretionary revenue and expenditure
policies. Whle there are important arguments against active use of discretionary fiscal
policy, particularly where automatic stabilizers are large, ajudicious use of temporary and
fast-acting policy measures to support aggregate demand is appropriate in the face of a
significant negative output gap, particularly if the automatic stabilizers are weak, as in Korea.
24. A medium-term fiscal framework can be used to reconcile short-term and longer-term
fiscal objectives. Under such a framework, temporary deviations from the balanced budget
objective would be allowed so long as the medium-term fiscal path is acceptable. In the
meantime, transparency and accountability would ensure that any short-term build up of
public debt wil be unwound in the medium term. In this regard, the govemment could
usefully prepare and submit to the parliament, together with the budget bil, an annual fiscal
strategy statement that sets out the government's medium-term fiscal objectives (for
example, to reduce debt levels to a stated level), and any temporary fiscal policy actions
needed to moderate cyclical fluctuations in economic activity, as well as plans for their
reversaL.
25. If and when the automatic fiscal stabilizers are strengthened, a useful approach to the
adoption of a medium-term fiscal framework that is consistent with fiscal prudence is to set
aggregate expenditure policy according to medium-term targets, while allowing revenues to
fluctuate with the level of economic activity. Such an approach would avoid expenditures
that are significantly higher in a downturn or substantially lower in a boom, and would also
address the concern that higher expenditues may be more difficult to trim once an economy
slows (Heller, 2002).
8 Cyclically adjusting the budget balance is not a straightforward exercise since it is an
inherently judgmental exercise to estimate the output gap. However, such difficulties do not
obviate the need to form a view of the cyclical positions of the economy.
- 34-
F. Concluding Remarks
26. To improve the effectiveness of the budget as a tool ofmacroeconoilic management,
the Korean authorities should strengthen their macroeconomic and revenue forecasting
capabilities. They should also improve their analysis of the demand impact ofthe budget, pay
greater attention to the cyclical effects of the budget, and reduce the uncertainty in budgetary
outtS. A more transpaJent and accountable budgetary system wil be essential to the
success of such efforts. One of the reform prioiities should be to streamline the budget
stnicture by consolidating special accounts and public funds so as to reduce drastically their
number as well as their share of expenditure.
27. Budget implementation should be improved by enhancing fiscal monitoring and
reporting. Formal arrangements should be put in place for regular in-year monitoring and
reporting on budget implementation centered on a mid-year review. Such a review should
enable the authorities to revisit the economic assumptions underlying the budget on the basis
of the latest macroeconomic forecasts; to examine the actual course of revenue and
expenditue in relation to budget plans, and examine the reasons for any significant
variations; to consider the need for any in-year adjustments and to ensure that such
adjustments will be implemented in good time; and to provide a firm basis for decisions on
the budget for the following year and for rollng forward the medium-term expenditue plans.
- 35 -
REFERENCES
Chalk, Nigel A., 2002, "Strctural Balances and All That: Which Indicators to Use in
Assessing Fiscal Policy," IMF Working Paper WP/021l01 (Washington, D.C.:
International Monetary Fund).
Heller, Peter S., 2002, "Considering the IMF's Perspective on a Sound Fiscal Policy," IMF
PoJicy Discussion Paper PDP/02/8 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund).
International Monetary Fund, 2001, "Republic of Korea-Repoli on Observance of
Standards and Codes-Fiscal Transparency Module."
Jun, Joosung, 2002, "Fiscal Policy During and After the Crisis in Korea," processed, Ewha
University, Seoul, Korea.
Koh, Young-Sun, 2000, "Budget Strctue, Budget Proc.ess, and Fiscal Consolidation in
Korea," Korea Development Institute.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), forthcoming, OEeD
Economic Surveys: Korea.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2000, OEeD Economic
Surveys: Korea.
Van den Nord, Paul, 2000, "The Size and Role of Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers in the 19908
and Beyond," OECD Economics Departent Working Paper No. 230.
